On April 15, 2026, an Accra High Court delivered a ruling that sent tremors through Ghana’s legal and governance establishment. In a single judgment, it declared the Office of the Special Prosecutor’s ongoing criminal prosecutions null and void pending formal authorisation — and ordered the Attorney-General’s Department to immediately assume control of all affected cases.
The ruling was not the product of a legislative repeal or a political coup. It was, on its face, a constitutional interpretation. But its implications are anything but narrow.
The judgment turns on Article 88 of Ghana’s 1992 Constitution, which vests primary prosecutorial authority in the Attorney-General. The court held that the OSP’s enabling legislation — Act 959 — cannot override this constitutional provision without the AG first granting explicit fiat or authorisation for prosecutions to proceed.
In other words, the OSP may investigate. But to prosecute, it must, in the court’s reading, have the AG’s blessing. Without it, every prosecution the OSP has independently initiated is, legally speaking, on shaky ground.
Special Prosecutor Kissi Agyebeng wasted little time in signalling his office’s response. The OSP has announced it is pursuing urgent legal steps to overturn the decision, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to effectively strike down provisions of an Act of Parliament — a challenge that now sets the stage for a higher-order constitutional confrontation.
That confrontation, in fact, is already underway. A related constitutional challenge is pending at the Supreme Court, where the Attorney-General has filed arguments questioning the OSP’s independent prosecutorial powers altogether. The High Court ruling has now given that argument significant momentum.
Why This Feels Like a Backward Step:
To understand what is at stake, it is worth recalling why the OSP was created in the first place. When Parliament passed Act 959 in 2017 and the office was established in 2018, the animating logic was straightforward: Ghana’s existing anti-corruption architecture had consistently failed to land meaningful blows on high-level public sector graft. Delays were endemic. Prosecutions of the so-called “big fish” were rare.
Perceptions of selective enforcement were widespread. The AG’s office, serving simultaneously as the government’s chief legal adviser and its primary prosecutor, was structurally ill-positioned to pursue cases that could implicate political allies or cabinet colleagues.
The OSP was designed as an answer to precisely that problem — an independent, specialised body with a singular mandate, insulated from the political sensitivities that had long undermined accountability efforts through conventional channels.
The ruling now risks undoing that insulation. Centralising prosecutorial authority back under the AG — a political appointee and sitting Cabinet member — raises legitimate questions about whether high-profile cases involving government officials or their associates will continue to be pursued with the same rigour, or at all.
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Critics of the OSP would argue the office’s track record has never fully justified the weight of expectation placed upon it. Some seven convictions, a portfolio of initiated prosecutions, asset recoveries, and reported savings running into billions of cedis represent a tangible but contested legacy — one that many observers have felt fell short of what the institution’s mandate and resources warranted.
Those criticisms are not without foundation. But a limited track record is a very different thing from no track record. And the question before Ghana now is not whether the OSP has been perfect, but whether the alternative — prosecutorial authority consolidated within an office that answers directly to the executive — is more likely to deliver the accountability the country needs.
A Grey Zone, Not a Graveyard — For Now
It bears emphasis that this ruling does not abolish the OSP. The office remains operational, continues to investigate, and has signalled it will maintain scheduled court appearances for ongoing matters. Legislative attempts to repeal Act 959 outright — which surfaced in parliamentary debate in late 2025 — were reportedly resisted by President Mahama at the time, and no such repeal has materialised.
What exists now is something arguably more unsettling than abolition: ambiguity. The OSP’s prosecutorial role sits in a legal grey zone, its authority contested at multiple levels of the judiciary simultaneously, while the AG’s office steps in as the constitutional default.
How Ghana’s courts resolve that ambiguity — and how quickly — will do much to determine whether the country’s anti-corruption moment survives this jolt intact, or quietly fades into the long list of institutional reforms that promised more than they ultimately delivered.
The AG’s office has its own Directorate of Public Prosecutions and can (in theory) handle these cases robustly if prioritised and adequately resourced.
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Some legal voices (including senior practitioners) have long argued that duplicative structures create confusion and that strengthening the AG’s capacity — rather than parallel bodies — might be more efficient and constitutionally cleaner.
True effectiveness against corruption in Ghana has never hinged on one office alone. It depends on: Political will from the executive and legislature, judicial independence and speed, stronger investigative bodies (e.g., EOCO, CHRAJ, Auditor-General), civil society pressure, whistleblower protection, asset declaration enforcement, and public procurement reforms.
Addressing systemic issues like weak institutions, low salaries in public service, and cultural tolerance for “gifts” or patronage. If the OSP’s investigative role survives but prosecutions must route through the AG, it could create bottlenecks or perceived conflicts — especially in cases touching the current administration. Conversely, if the Supreme Court upholds broader independence for the OSP, the office could emerge stronger with clearer legal footing.
Ghana’s Corruption Perceptions Index has hovered in the low 40s (out of 100) for years — modest progress at best. Public trust erodes when institutions appear weakened or captured, regardless of which party is in power. The real test will be whether high-profile investigations continue without fear or favour, and whether convictions (or meaningful recoveries) follow.
This episode highlights a deeper tension: balancing specialised anti-corruption tools with constitutional separation of powers. Many Ghanaians share their frustration — the optics of centralising control under the AG, amid ongoing debates, don’t inspire confidence. But the fight isn’t structurally “dead” yet; it’s contested in the courts and public discourse.
Sustained pressure from media, CSOs, and citizens on outcomes (not just institutions) will matter more than any single office’s fate.